On Lacan and Mathematics by Plotnitsky, Arkady
Œuvres & Critiques, XXXIV, 2 (2009)
On Lacan and Mathematics
Arkady Plotnitsky
Imaginary roots are a subtle and wonderful resort of the divine spirit, a 
kind of hermaphrodite between existence and non-existence (inter Ens 
and non Ens Amphibio).
 Leibniz
As I was, in October of 1997, contemplating the idea of this essay, an e-mail 
arrived from a physicist friend of mine. The message concerned Lacan and 
reflected the recent events sometimes referred to as the “Science Wars,” 
in the wake of Paul Gross and Norman Levitt’s book Higher Superstition: 
The Academic Left and its Quarrel with Science and physicist Alan Sokal’s 
hoax article published in the journal Social Text. Sokal and his co-author, a 
Belgian physicist Jean Bricmont, then just published their book, Impostures 
intellectuelles, devoted to the misuse or even abuse (alleged by the authors) 
of mathematics and science by some among leading French intellectuals. 
Lacan’s work appears to be seen by the authors as arguably the most notori-
ous case of this alleged abuse, and some of Lacan’s statements they cite were 
bound to attract a special attention, which prompted my friend’s e-mail. It 
said:
Does Lacan really talk about the penis and the square root of minus 1 with 
a straight face, as reported in Saturday’s NY Times article on the Sokal and 
Bricmont book? And if so is there any way to view this as anything but a 
complete nonsense? I am testing the limits of my open-mindedness. This 
seems to go beyond them.
I shall, by way of replying to these questions here, sketch an argument 
applicable to Lacan’s usage of mathematical ideas other than imaginary 
numbers (such as the square root of –1), for example, those borrowed 
from topology and mathematical logic, two other prominent areas of 
mathematics ventured into by Lacan. I shall deal directly, however, only 
with imaginary numbers and Lacan’s argument, leading to the statement in 
question, in “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in 
the Freudian Unconscious” (Écrits). It is worth noting at the outset that, as 
a psychoanalytically informed reader would be aware (my physicist friend 
wasn’t), the erectile organ of Lacan’s statement is not the same as the penis. 
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It may not even quite be seen as the phallus, defined by Lacan in the same 
essay as “the image of the penis,” but instead as in turn the image of the 
phallus – the image of the image of the penis.1
I shall more or less bypass the “Science Wars” debates here.2 Regardless 
of potential problems with the work of Lacan and other authors under 
criticism, arguments against them by Gross and Levitt, Sokal and Bricmont, 
and other recent critics in the scientific community can hardly be seen as 
ethically, scholarly, and intellectually appropriate, or indeed as in accord 
with the spirit of scientific inquiry itself. Let me hasten to add that I here 
refer specifically to the “Science War” criticism, such as that by the authors 
just mentioned, and not to the views or opinions concerning these subjects 
of the scientific community in general. Indeed, it is my view that such 
critics as Gross and Levitt or Sokal and Bricmont do not represent, and 
should not be seen as representing, science and scientists. The criticism of 
these particular authors is disabled by: a) their lack of necessary familiarity 
with specific subject matter, arguments, idiom, and context of many works 
they criticize; b) their inattentiveness to the historical circumstances of 
using mathematical and scientific ideas in these works; c) their lack of the 
general philosophical acumen, which is necessary for understanding most 
of the works in question; and d) their insufficient expertise in the history 
and philosophy of mathematics and science. These factors, which are, as 
will be seen, manifest in Sokal and Bricmont’s “treatment” of Lacan, make 
any constructive criticism virtually impossible. Lacan’s statement in ques-
tion is a part of a complex psychoanalytical and philosophical conceptual 
assemblage, and of an equally complex textual network. It makes little, if 
any, sense without taking them and their context into account, or without 
translating Lacan’s ideas into a more accessible idiom. Even such transla-
tions are bound to retain considerable complexity for the general audience. 
The psychoanalytical or even philosophical substance of Lacan’s argument 
requires no mathematics as such, which one can “decouple” from this 
argument by “translating” Lacan’s statements containing mathematical 
references into statements free from them. The reverse, however, cannot be 
done: one cannot decouple “Lacan” from the “mathematics” he uses. One 
cannot meaningfully read Lacan mathematical or quasi-mathematical state-
ments by extracting them from their psychoanalytical and philosophical 
content and context.
 1 Indeed, as will be seen, if considered as the square root of -1 of Lacan’s “algebra” 
(which, I shall argue here, is not mathematics), “the erectile organ” in Lacan is a 
formalization of the image of the image of the penis.
 2 I have addressed the subject elsewhere, in “’But It Is Above All Not True’: Derrida, 
Relativity and the ‘Science Wars,’” and “On Derrida and Relativity: A Reply to 
Richard Crew.” 
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Admittedly, the task of reading Lacan is not easy, in view of their idio-
syncracies, convolutions, fragmented or even spasmodic textual economy, 
and other complications, in part resulting from the fact that one usually 
deals with transcripts of oral presentations. Luckily, I need not deal with 
these problems here, since I need not fully spell out Lacan’s psychoanalyti-
cal argument for my purposes. My argument and claims are of a different 
nature. They concern, first, the way mathematics is used in Lacan, not the 
mathematical accuracy of his mathematical references (although, as will 
be seen, Lacan is far from being as bad on this score as some of his critics 
claim), and, second, philosophical, rather than psychoanalytical, dimensions 
of Lacan’s work. More generally, I am interested in the interconnections 
between, on the one hand, philosophical and, on the other, mathematical 
ideas. I am also interested in the structure of philosophical concepts as such, 
and Lacan’s concepts will be here considered as philosophical concepts. 
Such concepts often entail an engagement of different disciplines and fields 
of inquiry. The term “concept” itself is used here in the sense Deleuze and 
Guattari give it in What Is Philosophy?, rather than in any common sense 
of it, such as an entity established by a generalization from particulars, or 
indeed “any general or abstract idea,” as Deleuze and Guattari argue, via 
Hegel (What Is Philosophy? pp. 11–12, 24). A philosophical concept is an irre-
ducibly complex, multilayered structure – a multi-component conglomerate 
of concepts (in their conventional sense), figures, metaphors, particular 
(ungeneralized) elements, and so forth. This complexity is, I argue, manifest 
in Lacan’s concepts. Psychoanalytical dimensions of Lacan’s conceptual 
economy is a separate matter, which I will not be able properly to consider 
here, although they are of course crucial to Lacan’s work.3 This essay, thus, 
concerns primarily the philosophical component of Lacan’s discourse, and 
the role of mathematics there will be considered accordingly. I shall return 
to the question of the relationships between mathematics and philosophy 
in the end of this essay. It may be recalled here, by way of justifying this 
approach, that Lacan’s essay in question was a contribution to a philosophi-
cal conference entitled “La Dialectique.” Its first reference is Hegel and The
Phenomenology of the Spirit. Hegel is one of the key, even if mostly implicit, 
subjects of the essay, indelibly inscribed in the phrase “the dialectic of 
desire” of its title. The structure of philosophical concepts is, in my view, 
 3 The secondary literature on the subject is, of course, immense. See, in particular, 
Guy Le Gaufey’s numerous contributions, which offer a cogent and rigorous treat-
ment of the subject, including as concerns the connections between the Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and the philosophical problematics of modern mathematics and 
science.
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where Lacan’s usage of mathematics most fundamentally belongs and the 
best perspective from which this usage can be meaningfully considered.
From this perspective, there is a way, at least one way, to argue that the 
statement in question and the connections (rather than an identification or 
even a metaphor) between the erectile organ and the square root of –1 makes 
sense. Ironically, in order to pursue this argument one has indeed to know 
something not only about Lacan but also about imaginary and complex 
numbers, and their history. On that score, Sokal and Bricmont appear to be 
rather less informed than they could have been and, even more ironically, 
in some respects perhaps less informed than Lacan was. They appear to be 
taking complex numbers for granted as a self-evident mathematical object. 
The situation, however, is more complicated, both mathematically and, 
especially, philosophically.
Accordingly, it may be useful to review basic facts concerning imaginary 
and complex numbers, and numbers in general.4 Given their crucial role in 
defining first irrational and then complex numbers, square roots will be my 
primary focus. Let us recall, first, that the square root is the mathematical 
operation reversing the square of a number. The square of 2 is 4, the square 
root of 4 is 2, or of course –2, which is of some significance here. I hope I 
will be forgiven for being so elementary, but I want even those who know 
nothing, or forgot everything, about mathematics (unlike Plato we do admit 
them into the Academy these days) to understand my argument. Besides, 
things get more complicated rather quickly. Thus, the square root of 2 is 
already a far more complex matter, both mathematically and philosophi-
cally, although it is of a rather straightforward mathematical genealogy. One 
needs it if one want to know the length of the diagonal of the square. This is 
how the Greeks discovered it. If the length of the side is 1 the length of the 
diagonal is the square root of 2. I would not be able to say – nobody would – 
what its exact numerical value is. It does not have an exact numerical value: 
it cannot be represented (only approximated) by a finite, or an infinite 
periodical, decimal fraction, and accordingly, by a regular fraction – by a 
ratio of two whole numbers. It is what is called an irrational number, and 
 4 The discussion to follow is indebted to a number of technical and semi-technical 
accounts, in particular, Elie Cartan, “Nombres complexes. Exposé, d’après l’article 
allemand de E. Study (Bonn)” (which, along with Study’s article itself appears 
to shape most accounts of the subject by mathematicians), Reinhold Remmert’s 
chapter, “Complex Numbers” in Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus, et al, Numbers (which, 
too, follows Cartan rather closely) and David Reed, The Figures of Thought. I am 
grateful to David Reed for especially helpful discussions of several key math-
ematical and philosophical questions to be addressed here. I also grateful to Barry 
Mazur, Michael Harris, and David Mermin for productive exchanges on these 
subjects.
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it was the first or one of the first such a number – or (they would not see it 
as a number) mathematical object – discovered by the Greeks, specifically 
by the Pythagoreans. The discovery is sometimes attributed to Plato’s friend 
and pupil Theaetetus, although earlier figures are also mentioned. It was an 
extraordinary and, at the time, shocking discovery – both a great glory and 
a great problem, almost a scandal, of Greek mathematics. The diagonal and 
the side of a square were mathematically proven to be incommensurable, their 
“ratio” irrational. The very term “irrational” – both alogon (outside logos) 
and areton (incomprehensible) were used – was at the time of its discovery 
also used in its direct sense. The discovery, made by the Pythagoreans 
against themselves, may be seen as the “Gödel theorem” of antiquity.5
It undermined the Pythagorean belief that, as everything rational, the 
harmony of the cosmos was expressible in terms of (whole) numbers and 
their commensurable ratios (proportions). This discovery was also in part 
responsible for a crucial shift from arithmetical to geometrical thinking 
in mathematics and philosophy. For, while the diagonal of the square was 
well within the limits of geometrical representation, it was outside those of 
arithmetical representation, as the Greeks conceived of it.
We now call fractions and whole numbers rational numbers. Rational 
numbers together with irrational numbers (such as some roots of all powers 
and still other irrational numbers, such as pi, which cannot be represented 
as roots or even as solutions of polynomial equations) are called real
numbers. Real numbers can be either positive or negative, or zero (the latter, 
incidentally, unknown to the Greeks).6 The main reason for using this term 
is that real numbers are suitable for measurements, in particular of the 
length of line-segments, straight or curved, in the material world around us, 
the world of things that are, or appear to be, real. We can also represent and 
visualize them as points on the continuum of the straight line. We can do 
all standard arithmetic with real numbers and generate new real numbers in 
the process – add them, subtract them, multiple them, divide them, and so 
forth. (The same is true for rational numbers, but, because of division, not 
for whole numbers.)
Now “there’s the rub” – the square root. If a number is positive, there 
is no problem. We can always mathematically define its square root and 
calculate it to any degree of approximation. However (this is the rub), in 
the domain of real number the square root can be defined, can be given 
 5 It is worth noting here that the method used in the proof – an argument based 
on the so-called excluded middle (still the most common and effective form of 
mathematical proof) – was originally used by Parmenides and Zeno, and formed 
one of the foundations of dialectic, the invention of which is credited to them.
 6 It is worth observing here that the mathematical legitimacy of negative numbers, 
too, was a matter of a long debate, extending to the eighteenth century.
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mathematical sense, only for positive numbers. This is so for a very simple 
reason (recall that the square root is the reversal of the square): whether you 
square a positive or a negative number – that is, multiply any number by 
itself – the result is always positive. Thus, 2 by 2 is 4, and –2 by –2 is also 4, 
and the same is for 1 and –1 – the square of both is 1. In a sense, square roots 
of negative numbers, such as –4 or –1, do not exist, at least in the way real 
numbers exist, or appear to exist. This is why, when introduced, they were 
called imaginary, and sometimes even impossible, numbers.
Why bother, then? First, from early on it appeared (correctly) that one 
could operate with square roots of negative numbers as with any other 
numbers – add them, subtract them, multiply them, divide them, and so 
forth. Moreover, the impossible square root of –1 appears most naturally in 
the simplest algebraic equations – such as x2 + 1 = 0. This is how the square 
root of –1 and other “imaginary quantities,” as they were called, made their 
first appearance during the Renaissance. Indeed roots of negative numbers 
naturally emerge throughout mathematics. In short, on the one hand, 
mathematics at a certain point appeared to need to be able to deal with 
square roots of negative numbers, beginning with –1. On the other hand, 
it was clear that such “numbers” could not be any numbers already avail-
able.
It took the mathematics community a while (nearly two centuries) to 
accept the mathematical legitimacy, let alone reality, of these new numbers, 
and rigorously to define them. Their status as mathematical objects has 
remained in question for much longer, especially in philosophical terms of 
their mathematical reality, or as concerns their possible role in describing 
material reality, as in physics (which remains a complex question to this 
day). The resolution required a very great and protracted effort and the 
best mathematical minds available. It was achieved by a seemingly simple, 
especially from our vantage point, but in truth, at least at the time, highly 
nontrivial stratagem – by formally adjoining the square root of –1 to real 
numbers. This “simple” resolution amounted to the introduction of new 
numbers and of a new kind of numbers, which could be manipulated in the 
manner of all other numbers. This why they were first called first imaginary 
(and sometimes impossible) numbers, and then complex numbers, which 
are entities a little more complicated than square roots, although they 
have been known for just as long. The square root of –1, also called i, is the 
simplest such number. Other complex numbers are written in the form A + 
Bi, where A and B are real numbers (in the case of imaginary numbers A = 0). 
The square root of –1, may be seen as the fundamental element, by adjoin-
ing which to the old domain of real numbers the new domain is generated. 
Just as real (or rational) numbers do, complex numbers form what is in 
mathematics called a “field” – a multiplicity with whose elements one can 
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perform standard arithmetical operations with the outcome being again an 
element of the same multiplicity.
With the introduction of complex numbers it also became possible to 
represent the whole system on the regular real (in mathematical sense) 
two-dimensional plane, with the line representing real numbers serving, 
symbolically, as the horizontal axis and the line representing imaginary 
numbers (strictly square roots of negative numbers) as the vertical axis in 
the Cartesian-like mapping of the plane. The square root of –1 or i would be 
plotted at the length equal to 1 above zero on the vertical axis. In this repre-
sentation the domain of complex numbers is two-dimensional, in contrast 
to the one-dimensional domain of real numbers as represented by the line. 
This representation is sometimes called the Argand plane, although it was 
a great, one of the greatest ever, mathematician Karl Friedrich Gauss, who 
legitimized it as part of giving legitimacy and perhaps reality to complex 
numbers.7 “You made possible the impossible” was a phrase (which also 
refers to complex numbers) used in a congratulatory address on the on the 
50-year jubilee of his doctorate. In 1977 the German Post Office issued a 
stamp illustrating the Gauss-Argand plane to celebrate the bicentenary of 
his birth in 1777 (obviously a very lucky sequence of numbers).
The picture, however, is not without complications, although I can only 
indicate some among the complexities involved, not offer a full argument 
here. In particular, the real two-dimensional plane is – this is a mathematical 
fact – mathematically not the same object as complex numbers. Complex 
numbers, such as the square root of –1, and their operations, may be 
“represented” and “visualized” geometrically, via the two-dimensional real 
plane, only as a kind of diagram (the Gauss-Argand “plane”) – a schematic 
illustration, comprehensive (point by point) as it is – but not in themselves, 
not as mathematical objects with their actual (individual and collective) 
mathematical properties.8 The main reason for this is that a real (in math-
ematical sense) point on the two dimensional plane, for example, with 
Cartesian (now indeed Cartesian rather than Cartesian-like) coordinates, 
is not a “number.” In contrast to real numbers and their geometrical 
representation as the (real) line, there is no “natural” way to conceive of all 
necessary arithmetical operations, in particular multiplication or division 
 7 Gauss was also one of the discoverers of the non-Euclidean geometry, which 
discovery he, however, suppressed for twenty years for his fear of being laughed 
at by philistines, or perhaps for the reason the Pythagoreans thought it wise to 
conceal the existence the irrationals. Gauss did not think, as it happened rightly, 
that the world was quite ready for this. 
 8 In the language of mathematics, these two objects are not isomophic, insofar as 
one can asign (as will be seen, one can) to the real plane an algebraic structure at 
all.
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(addition and subtraction are not a problem) – that is, in the way the real 
line is “naturally” converted into arithmetics in the case of real number. As a 
result, complex numbers as such cannot in all rigor be seen as represented as 
points on the two-dimensional real plane and indeed are epistemologically 
unavailable as a visualizable or, more generally, geometrical, object. Their 
properties can of course be spelled out and rigorously comprehended 
algebraically. In the sense of algebraic representation, there is no epistemo-
logical difference between real and complex numbers (although there are 
fundamental differences in algebraic properties of two domains). Ultimately, 
complex numbers may remain not only imaginary, but, at least geometri-
cally, strictly unimaginable. They (in the ultimate structure of their proper-
ties and attributes) are certainly nonvisualizable as such, at least not in the 
way real numbers are. Epistemologically, at least in terms of its geometrical 
representability, the square root of –1 or, more accurately, the signifier “the 
square root of –1” signals – “represents” – the ultimate lack of geometrical 
representation. It is something that in itself is geometrically unvisualizable 
or unrepresentable, or, one might say, geometrically un-epistemologizable. 
This radical epistemological complexity of mathematical complex numbers 
explains the ambivalent attitude toward them on the part of many key 
figures involved in their discovery or creation.9
 9 Thus, Augustin-Louis Cauchy (1789–1857), a contemporary of Gauss and a 
great mathematician in his own right, had reservations concerning the geo-
metrical representation of complex numbers throughout his life. He considered 
them as purely symbolic (algebraic) entities and at one point even attempted 
a general mathematical definition of “symbolic expression” in explaining his 
attitude – to some discontent among his colleagues. (See Remmert’s commentary 
in Ebbinghaus, et al., Numbers, pp. 62–63). This situation and a more general 
problem of geometrical representation in post-18th century mathematics that it 
reflects has far reaching implications for modern mathematics, such as topology, 
of some of which Lacan appears to be aware. It is also worth noting here that 
certain, indeed quite radical, epistemological complexities are involved in the 
case of real numbers as well, or indeed of all numbers. I cannot consider these 
subjects here. Lacan aside, however, the question may well be: Do we know what 
is the number like the square root of –1, or indeed –1 (which, as I said, gave 
mathematicians some pause even as late as XVIIIth century), or for that matter 
1? It may be recalled that Frege once said that it is scandalous that we do not 
know what numbers really are. Lacan was aware of some of these complexities, 
as is clear from his comments on foundations of mathematics, including some of 
those cited by Sokal and Bricmont in Impostures intellectuelles (pp. 32–38). These 
passages cause Sokal and Bricmont much aggravation. In truth, however, they 
are at worst harmless, and often there is nothing especially wrong with them – if, 
again, one tries to understand Lacan’s actually argument where these passages are 
used. In general, Lacan and other radical thinkers in question in recent debates 
appear to be more aware of and attentive both to the philosophical dimension 
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It could appear “wondrous strange” indeed, and to some outright 
bizarre, that the theory of complex numbers has anything to do with the 
erectile organ. Given, however, the preceding discussion and some knowl-
edge of Lacan, it is not so difficult to see that Lacan’s “formula” is in fact 
not so strange. The epistemological point just made concerning complex 
numbers – their ultimately unavailability to visualization and perhaps 
any geometrical conceptualization, while they seem to be represented 
as points on the two-dimensional real plane – gives one a hint here. The 
erectile organ may be seen as theorized by Lacan as a symbolic object (also 
in Lacan’s sense of the symbolic), specifically a signifier (in Lacan’s sense), 
that is epistemologically analogous to the signifiers one encounters in the 
case of complex numbers, and specifically the square root of –1. Within 
the Lacanian psychoanalytic configuration, any image, in particular visual 
image, of the erectile organ, including that of an “erectile organ,” can only 
be an image of the signifier – the signifier, not the signified. (I shall further 
comment on this point presently.) This signifier itself is fundamentally, 
irreducibly non-visualizable. At the limit, this signifier – that is, its ultimate 
structure of, once again, the signifier designated as the erectile organ – may 
be inconceivable by any means, which epistemology or de-epistemization, 
and specifically de-visualization, are crucial to most of Lacan’s key concepts. 
Indeed, this signifier is in fact or in effect unnameable, for example, again, 
as the erectile organ, or the phallus, which, as I said, may not be the same as 
the erectile organ within the Lacanian economy of subjectivity and desire. 
That is, we can formally, “algebraically” manipulate its image or images, 
or names, or further formal symbols associated with it, just as we can 
formally manipulate complex numbers within their mathematical system, 
which Lacan’s “algebra” in part “mimics” but to which it is not identical. 
At the same time, however, we do not really know and perhaps cannot 
in principle conceive, at least from within the Lacanian psychoanalytical 
situation (defined by this economy of inaccessible signifiers), what the 
erectile organ really is as a signifier and what its properties are, if can speak 
in terms of properties here. The image of this signifier, and in particular its 
visual image, would, then, be analogous to the geometrical, hence visualiz-
able, representation of complex numbers, and in particular of the square 
root of –1, of which the erectile organ becomes an analogon within the Laca-
nian psychoanalytic “system,” rather than being a mathematical imaginary 
of the mathematical concept in question and their history themselves and to 
the philosophical thought (often in turn quite radical) of the key mathematical 
and scientific figures involved than their recent critics in the scientific com-
munity. This difference, too, is far from irrelevant to the nature of the debates in 
question.
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number.10 The situation may even be more subtle, insofar one may need to 
deal with further levels of formalization – that is, within still other “formal” 
symbols and structures associated with signifiers, such as the erectile 
organ – at which the analogy in question actually emerges. Let me stress 
that (whether one is within Saussure’s or Lacan’s scheme of signification) 
in question here is the irreducible inconceivability of the erectile organ as 
the signifier, not the signified. Its signified (such as, in Saussure, the concept 
behind it) and its referent, whatever they may be, may be in a certain sense 
even more “remote” and “inaccessible” or inconceivable. One would still 
need, however, to think in terms of the ultimate inaccessibility (which is not 
to say identity in terms of their functioning) of all three – the signifier, the 
signified, and the referent, which should be considered in the register of the 
Lacanian Real.11
My main argument here may be summarized as follows. Both the 
signifier of the erectile organ in the Lacanian psychoanalytic field and the 
square root of –1, i, in mathematics may be seen as fundamental formal,
symbolic, entities that enable an introduction of, and may be seen as 
structurally generating, two new symbolic systems – that of the Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (his (re)interpretation of Freud’s Oedipal economy) and the 
field of complex numbers in mathematics. In each case, the introduction 
of these new symbols allows one to deal with problems that arise within 
previously established situations but that cannot be solved by their means: a 
pre-analytic situation, or a more naively (for example, by way of misreading 
Freud, conceivably, to a degree, even by Freud himself) constructed analytic 
situation in psychoanalysis (where one needed, and in the previous regime 
could not, approach certain particular forms of anxiety), and the system of 
real numbers in mathematics (where one needed but could not rigorously 
define complex numbers in order, for example, to solve certain polynomial 
equations). In both cases, the philosophical-epistemological status of these 
new symbolic systems is complex. In particular, in question are: a) the 
extent to which such systems represent or otherwise relate to, respectively, 
psychological/psychoanalytic and mathematical reality (with the question 
of material reality in the background in both cases – the question of the Real 
in Lacan’s case); and b) the extent to which the properties of such symbolic 
10 Here and below the term “analogon” may also be understood in its Greek sense, as 
connoting a parallel or “proportionate” relation, rather than identity, of one logos
(here as “discourse”) to another. 
11 See Note 19 below. It can be argued (although I cannot pursue this argument here) 
that the epistemologically analogous triple inconceivability is also encountered 
in modern, and perhaps all, mathematics, in particular in the mathematics of 
complex numbers. 
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systems and of their elements, such as what is designated as the square root 
on –1, i, in mathematics, or the erectile organ in the Lacanian analysis, can 
themselves be accessed and specifically visualized by means of images, such 
as the geometrical representation of complex numbers or the image we form 
perceptibly or configure theoretically (and these are subtly linked in turn) of 
the erectile organ in the Lacanian psychoanalytic situation.12
In mathematics, these complexities, historically reflected in the term 
“imaginary numbers,” are, I would argue, not altogether resolved even now, 
although since and following Gauss most mathematicians stopped worried 
philosophically. Leibniz may well gave the problem its most glamorous 
expression: “Imaginary roots are a subtle and wonderful resort of the divine 
spirit, a kind of hermaphrodite between existence and non-existence (inter 
Ens and non Ens Amphibio)” (Math. Schriften 5: 357).13 Perhaps Descartes, 
who was one of the first to give serious consideration to imaginary roots 
and their nature, and indeed was first to use the very term “imaginary” 
(Cartan, “Nombres complexes,” 330 n.3), and who was the inventor of 
analytic geometry (which fundamentally relates geometrical and algebraic 
mathematical objects), should be given the last word here: “One is quite 
enable,” he said, “to visualize imaginary quantities.”14 Unless, the last word 
is Lacan’s, who in “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” says: 
“the square root of –1 does not correspond to anything that is subject to our 
intuition, anything real – in the mathematical sense of the term – and yet it 
must be conserved, along with its full functioning” (29). This may need to 
be more precisely stated, but is in essence right; and this statement grounds 
and guides my analysis here. It may be seen as an updated rendition of 
Leibniz’s early assessment: “From the irrationals are born the impossible or 
12 One must keep in mind here the difference between complex numbers, or indeed 
any mathematical object, and the Lacanian system in question as concerns their 
respective relationships with materiality (whether one sees the latter in terms of 
material reality in the classical sense or not). In the case of the Lacanian system, 
the relationships between the symbolic and the material are more immediately 
germane, somewhat similarly (although not identically) to the way mathematical 
models function in physics. In the case of mathematics, its symbolic systems may 
be seen as more or less independent of material objects – that is, such as those con-
sidered in physics, since other forms of materiality are irreducible in mathematics 
as well, and of course there is still the question of nonmaterial mathematical (or 
for that matter Lacanian) reality. I have considered the question of mathematical 
reality and its relations to physics in “Complementarity, Idealization, and Limits 
of the Classical Conceptions of Reality” (pp. 161–67). 
13 Cited by Remmert (Ebbinghaus, et al., Numbers, p. 58).
14 The statement occurs in “La géométrie,” published in 1637; it is cited by Remmert 
(Ebbinghaus, et al., Numbers, p. 58). 
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imaginary quantities whose nature is very strange but whose usefulness is 
not to be despised,” although numerous subsequent statements by leading 
mathematicians can be cited as well.15
In the same passage Lacan also speak of imaginary numbers as “irra-
tional.” The passage is cited both in Sokal’s hoax article and Impostures 
intellectuelles as an example of Lacan’s confusion of irrational and imaginary 
numbers. Lacan’s usage, however, does not appear to me due to his lack of 
understanding of the difference between real irrational numbers and imagi-
nary numbers, imputed to him by Sokal and Bricmont. Instead it may be 
seen as a reflection of his sense of imaginary numbers as an extension of the 
idea of irrational numbers – both in the general conceptual sense, extend-
ing to its ancient mathematical and philosophical origins, as considered 
earlier, and in the sense of modern algebra – which is correct, and displays, 
conceptually, a better sense of the situation on Lacan’s part than that of 
Sokal and Bricmont. Their description of irrational and imaginary numbers 
in their book is hardly edifying as concerns the substance and the beauty 
of the subject. It is also imprecise and misleading insofar as it suggests that 
there is no connection between irrational and imaginary numbers. Indeed, 
the claim even more strongly that they have nothing to do with each other 
(Impostures intellectuelles, p. 31). This is simply wrong. The profound connec-
tions between them define modern algebra. Certainly, complex numbers, 
beginning with i, are irrational numbers as the latter are defined by Sokal 
and Bricmont (as unrepresentable by a ratio of two whole numbers): no real 
fraction can be found to represent them, since no real number of any kind 
can represent them. The latter is a minor and trivial point, and one can 
hardly think that Sokal and Bricmont could be unaware of it. In general, I 
am not here holding Sokal and Bricmont responsible for their treatment of 
numbers as such, inadequate and imprecise as it is. They are physicists, not 
mathematicians or historians or philosophers of mathematics, and it is, in 
general, not their responsibility to know (or be precise about) mathematics 
and the philosophy and history of mathematics. It is, however, their respon-
sibility to know those aspects of all three that they consider in Lacan, and, 
assuming that they do, it is their responsibility to carefully consider and 
appropriately explain these issues, if they want to criticize Lacan.
The erectile organ of the Lacanian or, Lacan argues (in part “against” 
Freud himself), already Freudian system is, then, analogous to the math-
ematical square root of –1 – analogous, but not identical. Indeed, the proper 
way of conceiving of the situation is to see the erectile organ, or, again, a 
certain formalization of it, as (as defined by and as defining) “the square 
root of –1” of the Lacanian system itself – that is, as an analogon of the math-
15 Cited by Remmert (Ebbinghaus, et al., Numbers, p. 55). 
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ematical concept of the mathematical square root of –1 within this system – 
rather than anything identical, directly linked, of even metaphorized via 
the mathematical square root of –1.16 In a word, the erectile organ is the 
square root of –1 of Lacan’s system, the mathematical square root of –1 is 
not the erectile organ. There is no mathematics in the disciplinary sense in 
Lacan’s analysis, only certain structural and epistemological analogies or 
homologies with the mathematics of complex numbers, most particularly 
the following. First – the structural analogy – the erectile organ, as a signi-
fier, or indeed the signifier (in Lacan’s sense), belongs to and gives rise to a 
psychoanalytical system different from the standard one or ones (based on 
misreadings of Freud, conceivably to a degree by Freud himself), and to a 
different formalization – “algebra” – of psychoanalysis, a formalization that 
is more effective both conceptually and in terms of the ensuing practice. 
Second – the epistemological analogy – the erectile organ, as a signifier, or 
again, the (Lacanian) signifier of this system, while and in a sense because 
it governs the economy of the system, can only be approached by means 
of tentative, oblique and ultimately inadequate metaphors. It is ultimately 
inaccessible, along with its signified and its referent, at the limits inacces-
sible even as that which absolutely inaccessible but definable in terms of 
independent properties and attributes.
In order to explain the reasons for my argument, I shall sketch here 
some of Lacan’s logic and “algebra,” mimicking complex numbers, without 
fully spelling out the structure of Lacan’s key concepts – such as the subject, 
the signifier, desire, or indeed the erectile organ – which would require a 
perusal of a much larger textual field. Lacan defines a signifier in general, 
as “that which represent the subject for another signifier,” rather than for 
another subject (Écrits, p. 316).17 The signifier “S” is introduced – first as 
the “signifier of a lack in the Other [Autre], inherent in its very function as 
the treasure of the signifier” (316). Ultimately, however, “S” is “the signifier 
for which all the other signifiers represent the subject: that is to say, in the 
16 To the extend that one can speak of the metaphorical parallel, it operates at 
the level of two systems themselves. This, let me note in passing, is a classical 
Lacanian move, and it is often found elsewhere as well. For example, Poe’s The
Purloined Letter (in Écrits; the French edition) is read by Lacan as textualizing the 
scene and indeed the field of psychoanalysis, and is reread by Derrida as the scene 
of writing in Derrida’s sense in “Le facteur de la vérité” (The Postcard), as part of his 
deconstruction of Lacan. In the sense just explained, however, one can also speak 
of a certain “repetition” of Lacan on Derrida’s part, albeit a repetition in the sense 
of Derrida’s différance as the interplay of differences and similarities, distances 
and proximities, and so forth. 
17 See also the discussion in “Of Structure as an Inmixing” (The Languages of Criti-
cism, pp. 193–94). 
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absence of this signifier, all the other signifiers represent nothing, since 
nothing is represented only for something else” (p. 316). This signifier is 
argued to “be symbolized by the inherence of (–1) in the whole set of signi-
fier” (p. 316) This signifier is (symbolized as) the –1 of the psychoanalytical 
system in question in its “algebraic” representation (“algebra” is, again, that 
of Lacan). “As such, S is inexpressible, but its operation is not inexpressible, 
for it is that which is produced whenever a proper noun is spoken” (p. 316). 
In other words, “S” is operationally formalizable and this formalization is 
expressible.
The radical epistemology delineated earlier emerges already at this 
point, insofar as “S” is inexpressible as such. However, the formal object 
corresponding to “S” in Lacan’s “algebra” – “–1” – is analogous to the 
epistemology of the mathematical –1, rather than of the square root of –1, 
which is radically inaccessible (at least to a geometrical representation) even 
as a formal object.18 Then, however, another signifier, “s” – the symbolic 
square root of –1 – is derived, and is defined as that which is radically inac-
cessible, unthinkable, for the subject – both as such, similarly to “S,” and, I 
would argue, more radically, at the level of the corresponding element of the 
formal “algebra” built by Lacan. More generally, there are two interactive 
but distinct levels of the economy and epistemology of the signifier in Lacan 
– more general conceptual level (subject, the phallus, lack, and so forth), 
which is not quasi-mathematical, and the level of a certain “algebra,” which 
is quasi-mathematical and at which the analogy between this “algebra” and 
mathematics must be considered. The signifier “s” is not yet equated with 
the erectile organ at this point. However, a certain radically inaccessible 
signifier is argued to be inherent in the dialectic in the subject, indeed 
as the signifier ultimately generating this system or, again, yet another 
formalization of it, as the square root of –1 of this formalization, rather than 
the 1 or –1 (“S”) of the system. According to Lacan, “This [i.e. that which is 
designated or, again, formalized as the square root of –1] is what the subject 
lacks in order to think himself exhausted by his cogito, namely that which 
is unthinkable for him [although, we might add, appears as representable to 
him]” (p. 317). “But,” Lacan asks next, “where does this being, who appears 
in some way defective in the sea of proper names originates?” (p. 317)
In order to answer this question, Lacan maps the passage from the 
imaginary to the symbolic order, especially, as regards the phallic imagery. 
First, thanks to Freud’s “audacious step,” the phallus is argued to acquire 
the privileged role in the overall economy of signification in question, via 
18 See, however, Note 11 above. The question, crucial here, of “negativity,” in 
psychoanalytical or (via Hegel) philosophical terms, in Lacan would require a 
separate discussion. 
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the castration complex. Here one must keep in mind the difference between 
Freud and Lacan insofar as the Lacanian economy of the signifier (replacing 
Freud’s “signified”) is concerned, in particular as it relates to the phallus and 
the difference between the phallus (as a Freudian signified) and what Lacan 
here designates as the erectile organ as a signifier. The latter, moreover, may 
need to be seen as formalized yet further as “the square root of –1,” thus 
adding yet another “more distant” level of signification.19 Then, moving 
beyond, if not against, Freud, Lacan argues as follows:
The jouissance [associated with the infinitude involved in the castration 
complex in Freud]... brings with it the mark of prohibition, and, in order 
to constitute that mark, involves a sacrifice: that which is made in one 
and the same act with the choice of its symbol, the phallus.
 This choice is allowed because the phallus, that is, the image of the 
penis, is negativity in its place in the specular image. This is what predes-
tines the phallus to embody the jouissance in the dialectic of desire.
 We must distinguish therefore between the principle of sacrifice, which 
is symbolic, and the imaginary function that is devoted to that principle 
of sacrifice, but which, at the same time, masks the fact that it gives it its 
instrument. (Écrits, p. 319)20
It follows, according to Lacan, that it is the erectile organ – the image or 
better the signifier as an un-image of the phallus, and thus un-image of 
the image of the penis (in the Lacanian symbolic order) – that is subject to 
the equation of signification at issue.21 It is, then, as such and only as such 
that the erectile organ is the square root of –1 – that is, as “the square root” 
19 One can speak of “distancing” here only with considerable caution. For, although 
a certain efficacious materiality of the Lacanian Real can be seen as, in a certain 
sense, more “remote,” it cannot be postulated as existing by itself and in itself, 
as absolutely anterior, prior to or otherwise independent of signification. Hence, 
it cannot be seen as something from which the distance of signifiers can be 
unequivocally “measured.” One can speak in these terms only provisionally. 
Nor can the overall efficacity of the Lacanian signification can be contained by 
this materiality: this efficacity, along with its effects, such as signifiers, is funda-
mentally reciprocal in nature, including as concerns the relationships between 
materiality and phenomenality. In this sense, the expression “the image of the 
image of the image of the penis,” used earlier, must be seen as designating the 
“cite” of the multidirectional and ultimately interminable reciprocal network of 
the “material” and the “phenomenal,” although, indeed by the same token, other 
terms will be necessary in order to follow and to consider this network. 
20 Here one would need, of course, to consider the question of sacrifice in Lacan, 
via Hegel, in particular in the Phenomenology, and, then, Alexandre Kojève and 
George Bataille, both of whom are clearly on Lacan’s mind here as well. 
21 The difference between the erectile organ and the phallus would be inscribed 
accordingly, as indicated earlier. 
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within, and of, the Lacanian system itself in the symbolic order of its opera-
tion, or, again, more accurately, of a certain formalization of that system. 
“Thus the erectile organ comes to symbolize [again, also in Lacan’s sense of 
the symbolic] the place of jouissance, not in itself, or even in the form of an 
image, but as part lacking in desired image: that is why it is equivalent to 
the square root of –1 of the signification produced above, of the jouissance 
that it restores by the coefficient of its statement to the function of the lack 
of signifier –1” (p. 320).22 Accordingly, “the signification of the phallus” 
so conceived conforms to the economy of the inaccessible signifier. It can 
be shown that neither the signified not the referent are simply suspended 
here, and are in fact conceived of as ultimately inaccessible as well, via the 
Lacanian Real. For as Lacan says, “if [the erectile organ’s role], therefore, is 
to bind the prohibition of jouissance, it is nevertheless not [only] for these 
formal reasons” (Écrits, p. 320). Instead it is due primarily to a complex 
materiality, ultimately related to the Real and its epistemology. Indeed the 
Real in Lacan’s sense may be seen as this materiality (rather than reality). It 
may be best conceived as a certain radical (but not absolute) alterity inac-
cessible to a metaphysical configuring, oppositional or other, in particular 
as anything that can be seen as possessing any attributes (perhaps even 
the attribute of existence in any way that is or will ever be available to us) 
independently of our engagement with it.
To summarize, within the Lacanian psychoanalytical situation, the 
image or the signifier of the erectile organ is a scandal – in either sense, but 
most crucially in terms if its psychoanalytic management, or the difficulty 
or even impossibility of thereof. In this latter sense it is not unlike what 
the square root of –1 in mathematics was epistemologically at some point. 
Lacan’s approach is to refigure it as a symbolic object – specifically in Lacan’s 
sense of the juxtaposition between the symbolic and the imaginary. In the 
register of the imaginary “the signification of the phallus,” while conceiv-
ably involving to inaccessible signifiers and referents, may be seen as defined 
by accessible signifiers, but (in part as a consequence) is psychoanalytically 
useless. In the new system (in the symbolic register) the Lacanian signifiers 
themselves, in particular the erectile organ, are ultimately inaccessible. By 
the same token, a symbolic system (in Lacan’s sense of the symbolic) is 
introduced as the dialectic of desire and castration, which enables the subject 
defined by this systems and/as the Lacanian analytical situation to function. 
The symbolic object itself in question is given a specific formal structure, 
just as the square root of –1 is in mathematics. From this perspective, the 
22 It is significant that Lacan refers to “the signification produced above,” which 
suggests the difference between Lacan’s “algebra” and that of the actual math-
ematical complex numbers, rather than a claim of their identity on Lacan’s part. 
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erectile organ is not a real unity or oneness, positive or negative, neither 
“1” nor “–1,” or even anything merely fragmented, analogous to either 
mathematical real rational or real irrational. Instead it is a “solution” of the 
psychoanalytic equation which contains oneness – “1” – and the negative 
of oneness – “–1” – as terms but which makes the “solution” itself, while in 
a certain sense formalizable, inaccessible even at the level of the signifier, 
which, to the degree they offer us any image of it, all our imaginaries and 
visualizations ineluctably “miss,” along with the signified and the referent – 
the Real, keeping in mind the qualifications made earlier (Note 19). 
I am not certain to what degree Lacan’s epistemological ideas were 
derived from the epistemology of mathematical complex numbers. This is 
not inconceivable, especially given his statements cited here. He also knew 
enough mathematics and mathematicians to draw this parallel and to use 
it. I suspect that he was at least aware of these epistemological connections, 
as some of the statements cited above would indicate, even if he did not 
actually derive his scheme from the epistemology of complex numbers. 
There are, however, other candidates or the sources of this epistemology 
of the inaccessible at all levels of signification – the signifier, the signified, 
the referent – in more immediate semiotic terms, in the work of Saussure 
and Hjelmslef, on the one hand, and C.S. Peirce, on the other, or in more 
philosophical terms in the radical philosophy in the wake of Kant and 
Hegel, certainly in Nietzsche, although one can trace some of these ideas to 
Plato and the pre-Socratics.
It is, then, only in the sense of the square root of –1 of Lacan’s system, as 
just delineated, and not of the mathematical system of complex numbers, 
that the erectile organ is the square root of –1. This argument would clearly 
invalidate a kind of critique that Sokal and Bricmont level at Lacan, were 
their critique to survive far lesser levels of scrutiny. Unwittingly, Sokal and 
Bricmont’s own comment in fact says as much: “Even if [Lacan’s] ‘algebra’ 
made sense, the ‘signifier’, and ‘signified’ and the ‘statement’ contained 
in it are not numbers” (Impostures intellectuelles, p. 32). Of course not, this 
is the whole point.23 It is clear even from the most cursory reading that 
Lacan never says they are. Indeed in a sentence introducing the formula 
in question, the sentence cited by Sokal and Bricmont, Lacan says: “Thus 
by calculating that signification according to the algebraic method used here”
(Écrits, p. 317; emphasis added) – that is, according to Lacan’s “algebra,” not 
the actual mathematics of complex numbers, which is my point here.
23 The reader may be spared the rest of Sokal and Bricmont’s sentence, equally ironic 
in its confirmation of my point here and equally remarkable in its naiveté and 
blindness.
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Lacan’s construction here considered may have been designed primarily 
for the psychoanalytical purposes, although such purposes in Lacan is a 
complex matter. Either way, this construction is accomplished by way of 
an invention and construction of philosophical concepts in Deleuze and 
Guattari sense, which activity defines philosophy itself, according to their 
What is Philosophy? It is in my view this construction that gives us the best 
sense of Lacan’s use of mathematics. This point also allows me to close here 
by giving a reasonable definite, although not definitive, answer to the ques-
tion what is the place of mathematics in Lacan. Mathematics sometimes 
function in Lacan’s texts in a more direct and less complicated fashion of 
metaphor, illustration, and the like. For example, on some occasions certain 
constructions of modern topology, such as the Möbius strip and the Klein 
bottle, serve Lacan to find that which “we [can] propose to intuition in 
order to show” certain complex configurations entailed, Lacan argues, by 
neurosis, or psychosis (“Of Structure as an Inmixing,” 192), although the 
overall situation is ultimately more complex on these occasions as well. I 
do think, however, the primary and most significant usage of mathematical 
concepts in Lacan is as components of his own multilayered – irreducible 
nonsimple – concepts, conforming to Deleuze and Guattari’s definition (or 
concept) of the philosophical concept. The presence and role of such con-
cepts in Lacan is, in my view, unquestionable. Virtually any given sample 
of Lacan’s text manifest such concepts. In “The Subversion of the Subject,” 
imaginary numbers is only a portion of conceptual and metaphorical 
conglomerate, many components of which are borrowed from various 
domains – literature, religion, philosophy, or whatever – and many of them 
would require a kind of analysis just given for complex numbers.
As I said, this view shifts Lacan’s usage of mathematics into the 
philosophical from the psychoanalytic register, in accord with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ideas in What is Philosophy? It is of some interest that in the book, 
while examining the difference between philosophy (defined by deployment 
of concepts), and other fields, in particular mathematics, science, and art, 
Deleuze and Guattari omit psychoanalysis from this argument altogether. 
The relationships between psychoanalysis and philosophy have of course 
been subject of important recent investigations, such as Derrida’s, especially 
in The Post Card (where Lacan is the main subject, along with Freud and 
Heidegger), or elsewhere in Deleuze and Guattari, especially in Anti-Oedipus,
and indeed in Lacan’s essay in question, the essay also on Hegel. We know 
from these investigations that philosophy and psychoanalysis are multiply 
and perhaps irreducibly entangled, both historically and conceptually. This 
entanglement, however, is not symmetrical, and part of this asymmetry 
may entail a different (and more fundamental) role mathematical concepts 
and mathematics play in the philosophical vs. psychoanalytic thought and 
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discourse. Indeed, one may see Lacan’s usage of mathematics as in part an 
attempt to change this asymmetry, at least at a certain point, as part of his 
attempt to make psychoanalysis more scientific or, with Freud, to affirm its 
scientific character. In the process, Lacan did, I think, manage to enrich our 
understanding of the nature and complexity of the project of mathematics 
and science. The success of his deployment of mathematics and science 
in psychoanalysis qua psychoanalysis is a different question, in part given 
the very nature of his thought, work, and text. This argument may make 
mathematics primarily a part of Lacan’s work as an inventor of concepts and, 
hence, as a philosopher, rather than a psychoanalyst (to the degree that these 
can be distinguished in Lacan’s case). At the very least, the role of mathemat-
ics in Lacan is fundamentally philosophically mediated, also in Hegel’s sense 
of mediation [Vermittlung]. That, however, may well be how mathematics has 
always functioned outside its own sphere, and indeed often within it. 
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